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How does extending markets across national borders impact national institutions 
regulating labour markets? This paper addresses this question by analysing resistance in 
Germany to the European Commission’s draft Directive on an Internal Market for Services 
(COM(2004) 2 final/3). It demonstrates how the Commission’s initial attempt to integrate 
European service markets threatened to accelerate changes in the institutional structure of 
post-war German industrial relations. The paper shows how a broad spectrum of social and 
political interests in Germany united in successful opposition to this threat. It also 
demonstrates, however, that this resistance only postponed institutional reform in German 
labour markets and pushed the reform process—temporarily—from European to German 
legislative arenas. This study demonstrates that European market liberalisation, rather 
than driving the German state from labour markets, is pushing it to take a more active role 
in regulating employment. It also provides observations about processes of institutional 
change. 
 
Few pieces of European legislation have focused political attention in 
Germany like the so-called ‘Bolkestein Draft’1 of the European Commission’s 
directive for creating an internal market in services. This draft highlighted the 
impact of European integration on German labour markets. Its supporters—
inside and outside the FRG—viewed it as a cornerstone of the Lisbon Agenda 
and efforts to turn the EU into the world’s most competitive knowledge-based 
economy.2 Opponents portrayed it as an engine of ‘social and legal dumping 
[that] calls into question our labour laws and public services.’3 Underlying 
both visions is the expectation that European service market integration is 
liberalising labour market regulations in Germany and Europe, more 
generally. These perspectives mirror concerns about the broader liberalising 
impact of European integration4 and globalisation.5
                                                 
1 COM(2004) 2 final/3 ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on service in the internal market,’ March 5, 2004, available at: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0002:FIN:EN:PDF>. 
  
2 COM(2002) 441 final ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the state of the internal market for services’, July 30, 2002, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0441:FIN:EN:PDF>. 
3 D. de Villepin, cited in Open Europe, The services directive: Can Europe deliver? , p. 13, 
available at: <http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/services.pdf>. 





This paper investigates the German response to European attempts to 
liberalise labour market regulations in European service markets, particularly 
wage-setting mechanisms. It demonstrates that service sector integration has 
increased pressure on an already liberalising regulatory regime, driving the 
German state deeper into labour markets. Furthermore, it is the interests of 
German labour and capital that are driving renewed state intervention in 
labour markets. As these processes are on-going, the conclusions of this paper 
must remain preliminary. Nonetheless it demonstrates that, even as 
liberalisation proceeds, actors from across the political spectrum have fought 
to keep the process of re-regulating labour markets in German hands. 
 
This paper proceeds in three sections. The first section untangles the reality of 
the draft Services Directive from the hyperbolic rhetoric surrounding it 
throughout Western Europe, but, particularly, in Germany. The ‘Bolkestein’ 
Draft departed radically from previous practice by extending the ‘country-of-
origin’ principle generally across service sectors. However, it also included 
considerable protection for many existing national practices, particularly in 
the regulation of labour markets. A second section demonstrates why German 
resistance to the draft was so strong. The regulation of labour markets in 
Germany left it uniquely exposed to the effects of the application of the 
country-of-origin principle, even as the Red-Green government undertook its 
own liberalising reforms in service sectors. Integration of European service 
markets is forcing change in institutions to which employer and employee 
interests are bound. Rather than resolve the conflicts that arise from 
institutional change in a struggle over European legislation, however, German 
politicians, from the Left and the Right, fought successfully to reframe the 
Services Directive, remove the country-of-origin principle and limit the 
directive’s scope. Their actions, however, postponed rather than resolved a 
looming fight over institutional change. They transferred conflict—
temporarily—to the domestic German political arena. The third section 
analyses the possibilities for reform of German labour market institutions 
before the single market for services comes into being in 2010 and the 
restrictions on cross-national employment of CEE citizens end in 2011. It 
demonstrates that, while wholesale liberalisation and decentralisation of 
German labour markets remains a possibility, the interests of employees and 
employers point toward state action to reinforce existing institutions and/or 
direct regulation of labour relations. A concluding section suggests some 
implications of this development for our understanding of European 
integration as well as of the process and direction of institutional change. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5 S. Berger and R. P Dore, National diversity and global capitalism, Cornell University Press, 
1996; W. Streeck and K. A Thelen, ‘Introduction: Institutional change in advanced political 
economies’ in W. Streeck and K. Thelen (eds.), Beyond continuity: Institutional change in 
advanced political economies, Oxford University Press, USA, 2005, pp. 1-39. 
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The Internal Market for Services, the’ Bolkestein’ Draft and 
Hyperbole 
 
The Commission published its draft directive in January 2004. In the course 
of 2004-2005 the draft became embroiled in the controversies surrounding 
rising unemployment, Central and Eastern European enlargement and 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty—throughout Europe—as well as the 
Schröder Government’s Agenda 2010 labour market reforms within Germany. 
In this context, hyperbolic rhetoric consumed reasoned analysis of the 
directive’s provisions and consequences. This was especially true of the 
directive’s anticipated impact on labour markets. This section offers a brief 
sketch of the inflated expectations that surrounded the draft before providing 
more detail about its actual provisions with regard to labour regulations and 




The Commission started the rhetorical inflation by connecting the directive to 
radical social transformation. Its 2002 report on strategies for service sector 
integration concluded ‘that the goal set by the Lisbon Council to make the 
European economy the most competitive in the world cannot be met unless 
sweeping changes are made to remove barriers to cross-border services in the 
near future.’6 The Commission marketed the directive as the centrepiece in an 
effort to turn Europe—within a decade—into an ‘information society’. To ease 
fears about social upheaval, the Commission’s ‘Extended Impact Assessment’ 
suggested that ‘creation of a well-functioning Internal Market in 
services…could result in gains on an equivalent scale’ to those realised since 
the creation of the Internal Market in 1992.7 The Commission’s estimate of 
gains since 1992 was 1.8% growth in GDP and 2.5 million jobs. Because, as the 
Commission repeated tirelessly, services ‘account for 70% of GDP and 
employment’ in the EU,  equivalent gains in the service sector would—it was 
implied—yield greater gains in growth and employment.8 In a less publicised 
assessment produced for the Commission, however, Copenhagen Economics 
calculated the impact of service integration as a 0.6-0.7% of GDP growth and 
an employment increase of ‘up to 600,000’ jobs.9
 
 The Commission justified 
powerful legislative ‘medicine’ (discussed below) by inflating expectations 
about its impact on growth and employment. 
Once the Commission connected the directive to social transformation, 
opponents questioned the costs of the directive and the intentions underlying 
them. The application of the country-of-origin principle across service sectors 
                                                 
6 COM(2002) 441 final. p. 9. 
7 SEC(2004)2 ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Extended impact assessment of proposal for 
a directive on services in the internal market’, January 13, 2004, p. 29 (emphasis added). 
8 COM(2002) 441 final op. cit., p. 5; COM(2004) 2 final/3 op. cit., p. 5. 
9 Copenhagen Economics, Economic assessment of the barriers to the internal market for 






galvanised those who feared the directive’s impact on environmental and 
consumer protections, public provision of services and employment 
standards. In the context of the French referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty and the 2004 Enlargement, the directive was instrumentalised to fan 
popular fears about the impact of service sector integration on labour markets. 
The Accession treaty’s ‘freedom of services’ clause had produced—in the 
popular imagination, at least—an invasion of Polish plumbers, roofers and 
butchers willing to replace their French and German counterparts for 
‘dumping wages’.10 Opponents like TUC General Secretary Brendan Barber 
played on these fears, suggesting that the services directive ‘would fire the 
starting gun on a race to the bottom’ creating ‘flags of convenience’ in every 
part of the European service sector.11 European Trade Union Confederation 
General Secretary John Monks argued that ‘the Services Directive as proposed 
by the Commission…fosters regime competition, allowing 25 and soon 28 
member states to compete on each other’s territory at the expense of quality 
public and social services, the environment, industrial relations systems and 
workers’ rights’.12 Indeed, trade unionists across Europe found the draft to be 




The reality of the draft’s impact likely stood somewhere between visions of 
liberal utopia and the Satanic Mill. The draft was a complex document 
combining regulations in three areas.14 First, it set guidelines mandating that 
member states create ‘single points of contact’, ‘electronic means’ and specific 
authorisation procedures to simplify the administrative hurdles for 
establishing service businesses.15 It also prohibited certain legal and 
administrative requirements as preconditions for establishment.16 Second, the 
draft directive sought to build trust between member states by harmonising 
consumer protection legislation, particularly by specifying areas for enhanced 
cooperation among national authorities and by drawing up codes of conduct 
and measures to promote the quality of services.17
 
 It was the directive’s third 
area of focus, abolition of barriers to the free movement of services that 
provoked the greatest resistance. 
The Bolkestein Draft introduced two innovations in the way the Commission 
sought to regulate cross-border trade in services: the country-of-origin 
                                                 
10 M. Deggerich, ‘Der Osten kommt’, Der Spiegel/Spiegel Online, February 14, 2005, p. 32, 
available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-39367919.html>; J. Mey, ‘Die Crux der 
Dienstleistungsfreiheit', Frankfurter Rundschau, January 7, 2005, sec. Wirtschaft, p. 11. 
11 Trade Union Congress (TUC), ‘Some movement on services directive not enough for unions’, 
European Review, April 2005, p. 4. 
12 J. Monks, ‘Letter to Members of the Internal Market Committee of the European Parliament 
regarding Draft Directive on Services in the Internal Market’, October 3, 2005, available at: 
<http://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/letter_to_IMCO_031005_EN-3.pdf>. 
13 C. Fischbach-Pyttel, ‘2005 priorities! WORKING TIME and SERVICES DIRECTIVE - 
EPSU’, European Federation of Public Service Unions, 2005, available at: 
<http://www.epsu.org/a/895>. 
14 United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), ‘EU directive on services in the 
internal market: consultation document’, 2005, available at: 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23133.pdf>. 
15 DTI Ibid., p. 2. 
16 DTI Ibid. 
17 DTI Ibid. 
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principle and the simultaneous regulation of multiple (service) sectors.18 In 
Article 16, the country-of-origin principle subjected service providers ‘only to 
the national provisions of their Member State of origin’ and made the Member 
State of origin ‘responsible for supervising the provider and the services 
provided by him, including services provided by him in another member 
state.19 To reinforce country-of-origin legislation, the draft’s Art 24 
enumerated specific measures member states could not impose to control the 
operation of foreign firms on their soil.20 As constructed in the Bolkestein 
draft, the country-of-origin principle exceeded the liberalising impact even of 
‘mutual recognition,’ as that principle evolved in practice.21
 
 
In fact, the draft’s radical departure from past practice was not the country-of-
origin principle per se, but its application across multiple service sectors.22 
Previously, the Commission had included the country-of-origin principle in 
directives regulating ‘television without frontiers’ (89/552/EC, revised 
97/36/EC), electronic signatures (1999/93/EC) and e-commerce 
(2000/31/EC). The Bolkestein Draft however, did not set regulatory 
guidelines for an individual sector, but rather applied the country-of-origin 
principle to ‘services’ generally. It permitted derogations for specific sectors 
and activities, but liberalisation was the default option.23 This approach was 
novel in two ways. First, past integration of service markets had permitted 
member states to liberalise individual sectors and then harmonise regulations 
at the European level.24 The sweeping application of the country-of-origin 
principle made harmonisation secondary, clearly placing national 
deregulation above supranational re-regulation.25 Second, while previous 
directives applied the country-of-origin principle to sectors where the service 
itself crossed borders (e.g. television and e-commerce), the Bolkestein Draft 
applied it to sectors where both the service and the provider crossed borders.26
 
 
Skeptical observers questioned the capacity and incentive of member states of 
establishment to regulate the activities of service providers abroad. They 
argued that sweeping application of the country-of-origin principle would 
confuse jurisdictions and erode service quality as well as employee protection. 
                                                 
18 B. De Witte, ‘Setting the Scene: How did Services get to Bolkestein and Why?’, European 
University Institute Working Papers, Vol. 20, No. 11, 2007; Group of the Progressive Alliance 
of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament (S & D), ‘Policies: Services Directive’, 
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament 
(S & D), October 7, 2008, available at:  
<http://www.socialistgroup.eu/gpes/public/polidetail.htm?topicid=614&section=POL&categ
ory=POLI>; K. Nicolaïdis and S. K. Schmidt, ‘Mutual recognition 'on trial': the long road to 
services liberalization’, Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 14, No. 5, August 2007, pp. 
717-738. 
19 COM(2004) 2 final/3, op. cit., Art. 16, Para 2&3. 
20 COM(2004) 2 final/3 Art 24 Ibid. 
21 C-M. Jonsson, ‘Comparing the mutual recognition principle and the country of origin 
principle’, Paper for the ETUC Working Group on Social Policy and Legislation (May 25, 
2005); Nicolaïdis and Schmidt, op. cit. 
22 De Witte, op. cit.; S & D, op. cit. 
23 COM(2004) 2 final/3, op. cit., Arts 16-19. 
24 Nicolaïdis and Schmidt, op. cit. 
25 De Witte, op. cit. 




Anticipating these concerns, the draft’s authors permitted derogation from the 
country-of-origin principle in a substantial list of sectors and activities. Article 
17 permitted specific, general derogation for, among other things: postal 
services; electricity, gas, and water distribution; recognition of professional 
qualifications; notary services; matters of public health, policy and security; as 
well as some sectors and activities covered in other European legislation. Most 
importantly, Art.17(5) insulated labour market regulations from regime 
competition by exempting all ‘matters covered by Directive 96/71/EC,’ the 
Posted Workers Directive, from the country-of-origin principle. The Posted 
Workers Directive, accommodates diverse national labour market regimes 
within overarching European guidelines. It directs Member States—rather 
than the country-of-origin—to guarantee the terms and conditions of 
employment on their territory, covering: maximum work/minimum rest 
periods; paid holidays; minimum rates of pay; temporary employment; health, 
safety and hygiene at work; and discrimination.27 In setting these minimum 
standards the Directive recognises the validity of national regulations 
regardless of whether they were laid down ‘by law, regulation or 
administrative provision and/or by collective agreements or arbitration 
awards which have been declared universally applicable….’28
 
 Member states 
that lacked a system for declaring collective agreements universally applicable 
could base minimum employment standards on  
collective agreements or arbitration awards which are generally applicable to 
all similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned, and/or collective agreements which have been concluded 
by the most representative employers’ and labour organisations at national 
level and which are applied throughout the national territory, provided that 
their application…ensures equality of treatment....29
 
 
Thus, by subordinating labour market regulation to the Posted Workers 
Directive on the issue, the Bolkestein Draft recognised the dominance of host 
countries’ labour market regulations. The Bolkestein Draft confused this 
relationship, however, by limiting the mechanisms Member States could use 
to monitor the employment of posted workers.30
 
  
Even with such ambiguities, opponents—like the authors themselves—inflated 
the likely impact of service market integration and the Bolkestein Draft on 
national environmental, consumer and labour regulations. By applying the 
country-of-origin principle across the broad category of ‘services,’ the authors 
sought an ambitious, and ill-timed, acceleration of market integration.31 They 
intended to make liberalisation the default mechanism for service sector 
integration.32
                                                 
27 ‘Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services,’ Art 3(1) 
text/html; charset=UTF-8, Eur-Lex, available at: 
 To make liberalisation palatable, however, they embedded 
protections for diverse national welfare and regulatory systems in legislation. 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0071:EN:HTML>. 
28 96/71/EC, Ibid, Art 3(1). 
29 96/71/EC, Ibid, Art 3(8), emphasis added. 
30 COM(2004) 2 final/3, op. cit., Arts 24/25. 
31 Nicolaïdis and Schmidt, op. cit. 
32 Ibid. 
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In an environment characterised by unprecedented unemployment, polarised 
debates about the Constitutional Treaty and social insecurities associated with 
the Eastern Enlargement, such nuances were easily overlooked. Consequently, 
a broad and well organised opposition succeeded in forcing removal of the 
country-of-origin principle and labour regulation, in general, from the final 
directive. The fiercest opposition to the draft erupted in Germany, where the 
major political parties, unions and even many employers coalesced to revise 
the legislation. To understand the intensity of the German reaction, one must 
understand the peculiar impact of European integration on Germany’s 
evolving labour markets. The next section demonstrates this impact and why 
Germans wish to manage it domestically rather than through EU legislation. 
  
Service Integration, the Peculiarity of German Labour 
Markets and German Resistance 
 
The Bolkestein Draft created special problems and, therefore, met greater 
resistance in Germany. German politicians led resistance to the draft in the 
European Parliament and German governments—under both Social 
Democratic and Christian Democratic chancellors—led resistance in the 
Council. In German society, unions led the fight against the draft, while 
employers were—at best—ambivalent about it. The strength of this opposition 
reflects the vulnerability of Germany’s changing labour markets to EU 
integration. The fact that in many sectors German labour markets are 
‘heterogeneous’ makes them more sensitive to the effects of integration. 
Labour markets are heterogeneous in the sense that employment relations in 
some firms in a sector are governed by collective agreements negotiated in a 
centralised, ‘corporatist’ labour market regime, while employment relations in 
other firms—in the same sector—are governed by decentralised agreements 
‘negotiated’ between individual employers and employees.33
 
 The problem for 
Germans is that, while European regulations accommodate ‘corporatist’, 
‘statist’ or ‘liberal’ labour market regimes, they cannot abide discrimination or 
rules that permit domestic employers options that are unavailable to non-
German employers. This raises the possibility that integration will permit 
service providers to enter German markets outside of employers associations 
and the centralised collective bargaining system, thereby hastening its demise. 
The following explains the ‘heterogeneous’ regulation of German labour 
markets and outlines the coalition of social and political actors provoked by 
the draft Services Directive. 
‘Heterogeneous’ labour market regulations in Germany 
 
The regulation of German labour markets is unique among EU member states. 
Of the 25 EU member states in 2005, eighteen had some form of legislated 
minimum wage. Six of the remaining seven maintain the ‘functional 
                                                 
33 R. Bispinck and C. Schäfer, ‘Niedriglöhne und Mindesteinkommen: Daten und 
Diskussionen in Deutschland’ in T. Schulten, R. Bispinck, and C. Schäfer (eds.), Mindestlöhne 
in Europa, Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 2006, pp. 269–301; and T. Schulten, ‘Gesetzliche und 
tarifvertragliche Mindestlöhne in Europa—ein internationaler Überblick,’ in T. Schulten, R. 





equivalent’ of a universal minimum wage.34 These include the Scandinavian 
systems (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) in which union management of 
unemployment insurance programs, the so-called ‘Ghent System,’ ensures 
that union membership and collective bargaining agreements encompass 
more than 90% of employees.35 Germany has neither a legal minimum wage, 
nor universal coverage of employees under collective agreements. Rather, the 
post-war industrial relations system is built on collective bargaining between 
sectoral unions and employers’ associations who defend a tradition of ‘wage 
autonomy’ [Tarifautonomie] that insulates their negotiations from 
government influence. Even as unions and employers associations defended 
this system, however, an increasing number of firms have left employers 
associations and sectoral negotiations. The causes for their flight stretch back 
to the 1980s, but the movement has accelerated since unification.36 Erosion of 
the post-war system leaves a growing number of employees outside collective 
agreements in many sectors.37
 




% of Employees in Firms Bound by Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (West and East Germany 1996-2006) 38
 
 











































This development leaves Germany with a heterogeneous industrial relations 
system in which large numbers of employees remain inside the old corporatist 
system, while another large group finds itself outside it. Furthermore, 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are concentrated in different sectors. Large firms in 
core exporting industries tend to remain in the traditional, sectoral bargaining 
system, while smaller enterprises, often in the service sector and, more-often-
                                                 
34 Schulten, Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 18. 
36 S. J. Silvia, ‘German Unification and Emerging Divisions within German Employers' 
Associations: Cause or Catalyst?’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1997, pp. 187–208; K. 
Thelen, ‘Why German employers cannot bring themselves to dismantle the German model’ in 
T. Iverson, J. Pontusson, and D. Soskice (eds.), Unions, employers, and central banks: 
Macroeconomic coordination and institutional change in social market economies, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 138–169. 
37 A. Hassel, ‘The erosion of the German system of industrial relations’, Models of Capitalism: 
Debating Strengths and Weaknesses, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1999, p. 323; ‘The erosion continues: 
reply’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 40, 2002, pp. 309–317; and W. Streeck 
and A. Hassel, ‘The crumbling pillars of social partnership’, West European Politics Vol. 26, 
No. 4, 2003, pp. 101–124. 
38 G. Fischer et al., Standortbedingungen und Beschäftigung in den Regionen 
West- und Ostdeutschlands: Ergebnisse des IAB-Betriebspanels 2006, IAB 
Forschungsbericht, 2007, available at: 
<http://doku.iab.de/forschungsbericht/2007/fb0507.pdf>. 
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than-not, in East Germany are covered neither by sectoral or company-level 
collective agreements.39 Wages and security tend to be lower in these so-called 
‘blank spaces,’ where there is no collective bargaining, although ‘low’ wages 
are also found in sectors with collective bargaining.40
 
 This dichotomy of 
liberal and corporatist structures gives German labour markets a 
‘heterogeneous’ quality that marks an increasingly important division in 
German society. 
Labour market reforms introduced by the ‘Red-Green’ government of Gerhard 
Schröder also contributed to the heterogeneity of German labour markets. 
After unification, financing of Germany’s post-war welfare insurance schemes 
through employer and employee payroll contributions had the perverse effect 
of raising labour costs with rising unemployment.41 The Red-Green 
government attempted to reverse this adverse relationship, first, through 
corporatist coordination in the Bündnis für Arbeit (Alliance for Work) and, 
then, through legislated reform.42 The government’s Agenda 2010 legislation 
sought to move people back into the labour force by reducing unemployment 
payments and their duration.43
 
 The policies of Agenda 2010 liberalised 
German labour markets in three ways. First, the German state assumed a 
greater role in areas of labour market regulation where corporatist actors—
unions and employers’ association—traditionally played a central role in policy 
formation and implementation. Second, reforms shifted much of the risk of 
unemployment onto individuals. Finally, reforms further expanded low-wage 
employment that is often in service sectors and not covered by collective 
agreements. 
European integration created problems for German labour market regulation 
long before introduction of the draft Services Directive or Agenda 2010.44
                                                 
39 Hassel, ‘The erosion,’ op. cit. 
 The 
Single European Market and the Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC) forced 
German legislators to manage the problems of cross-border service provision 
in the 1990s. One response was the Posted Workers Law (AEntG 1996, 
amended in 1999 and 2009), permitting Labour Ministers to declare 
contractual agreements, where unions and employers associations negotiated 
contracts covering the entire country, binding for all employers and 
40 Bispinck and Schäfer, op. cit. 
41 G. Esping-Andersen, ‘Welfare states without work: the impasse of labour shedding and 
familialism in Continental European social policy’ in G. Esping-Andersen (ed.), Welfare states 
in transition: National adaptations in global economies, London: Sage Publications, 1996, 
66–87; P. Manow and E. Seils, ‘Adjusting badly: The German welfare state, structural change, 
and the open economy’ in F. Scharpf and V. Schmidt (ed.), Welfare and work in the open 
economy, vol. 2, 2000, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 264–307; 
and W. Streeck and C. Trampusch, ‘Economic reform and the political economy of the 
German welfare state’, German Politics, Vol.14, No. 2, 2005, pp. 174-195. 
42 J. N. Ziegler and J. Leslie ‘Policy experimentation and the search for institutional change: 
The politics of Red-Green reform in Germany’, UC Berkeley: Institute of European Studies, 
available at: <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5pq840bv>. 
43 V. Steiner, ‘Social welfare reform and the low-wage labor market in Germany: what works 
and what doesn’t’, Applied Economics Quarterly Supplement, Vol. 55, 2004, pp. 57–78. 
44 G. Menz, ‘Re-regulating the Single Market: national varieties of capitalism and their 





employees—domestic or foreign—operating in a given sector.45 Resistance to 
broader state intervention, however, limited the law’s scope, originally, to the 
construction industry.46
 
 In 2007 it was extended to salvage, roofing, cleaning 
and painting services. In 2008 the Merkel government extended the law to 
letter couriers. In 2009, six more low-wage sectors were brought under the 
law, including private security guards, rubbish disposal, personal home care 
and laundry services. The 2009 reforms also substantially eased the 
restrictions on Labour Ministers’ ability to declare collective agreements 
universally binding. Gaps in collective bargaining, however, spread well 
beyond these sectors, and the impending integration of labour markets as a 
result of Central and East European Accession and the Services Directive 
represents an uncertain potential to accelerate erosion of the post-war 
industrial relations system. 
Integration of labour markets confronts German unions and employers 
associations with a dilemma. Erosion of the post-war industrial relations 
system has left parallel corporatist and liberal employment regimes in many 
sectors. European legislation, however, proscribes discrimination against non-
German employers. Thus, service providers cannot be prevented from 
entering German markets under the liberal regime as long as this option is 
available to domestic service providers. An influx of service providers 
operating under decentralised, liberal labour market rules might hasten the 
erosion of the legacy corporatist system and exacerbate tensions between 
labour market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’ This left Germans three choices. The 
first two options saw the state intervening in labour markets: to legislate 
minimum employment standards or to reinforce the old collective bargain 
system through, for example, extension of the Posted Workers Law (AEntG). 
The third option would be to accept liberalisation without domestic reform 
and test whether existing institutions could withstand market competition. 
Because this choice has the potential to redistribute wealth and power 
significantly, it has provoked major conflict.47
 
 Powerful social and political 
interests in Germany coalesced to postpone the choice and transfer the 
decision from EU decision-making institutions to the domestic legislative 
arena in hope of finding a domestic solution to labour market reform before 
European service and labour markets open. Doing so, however, has meant 
that any constraints imposed on domestic labour market legislation by the 
Services Directive would have to be removed. 
German resistance to the draft directive 
 
A broad coalition opposed the country-of-origin principle in Germany. Union 
resistance to European legislation that might hasten erosion of Germany’s 
corporatist industrial relations system is less-than-surprising. German 
employers, however, were also ambivalent about the draft directive and did 
                                                 
45 R. Bispinck and T. Schulten, ‘Aktuelle Mindestlohndebatte: Branchenlösungen oder 
gesetzlicher Mindestlohn?’, WSI Mitteilungen, No. 3, 2008, pp. 151-158. 
46 Hans Boeckler Foundation, ‘Gesetzliche Stützen für das Tarifsystem’, Boecklerimpuls 9, 
2006, p.2. 
47 S. K. Schmidt, ‘When Efficiency Results in Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single 
Services Market’, West European Politics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2009, pp. 847–865. 
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nothing to support a move toward liberalisation of labour markets at the 
European level. Absent support from employers and in the face of strong 
union opposition, the major parties of the Centre-Left, the SPD, and Centre-
Right, CDU/CSU, lined up against the Bolkestein Draft. The following explains 
the diverse interests that converged in opposition to the draft in Germany. 
 
German unions have consistently opposed a legislated expansion of the low 
wage sector in principle even as erosion of the post-war industrial relations 
system has created one in fact. Contrary to its image as an egalitarian, high 
wage society, many Germans work for ‘low’ wages. Definitions of what 
constitutes ‘low’ wages vary. Using the OECD definition of 67% of the median 
wage as the threshold for ‘low’ wages, 22.6% of all employed Germans fell into 
this category in 2006.48 Furthermore, wage spread in Germany in 2005 was 
almost identical to Great Britain.49  ‘Low’ wage employment exists in sectors 
covered by collective agreements as well as those outside the contract 
system.50 The number of Germans falling into this category, however, has 
increased parallel to the erosion of post-war industrial relations institutions 
and is concentrated in those sectors—services—and regions—East Germany—
where these institutions are weakest.51 While unions disagree among 
themselves about how to combat low wages,52 they agree that an influx of 
foreign employers operating outside the corporatist industrial relations 
system is likely to expand low wage employment. Accordingly, the German 
Union Federation (DGB) deemed the country-of-origin principle and mutual 
recognition inappropriate means for large-scale market integration. These 
mechanisms, it argued, should be reserved for specific sectors where 
minimum standards and/or a certain level of harmonisation already existed.53 
Extrapolating from this conclusion, the DGB demanded removal of the 
country-of-origin principle (Article 16) from the draft and specification in 
Articles 1 (the directive’s goals) and 2 (the directive’s scope) that questions of 
social and labour law fall outside the directive’s jurisdiction.54
 
 In February 
2006 the European Parliament adopted these positions in amendments that 
became the basis for the final directive. 
German employers’ ambivalence toward the Commission draft is even more 
interesting than union resistance. From an orthodox liberal perspective, 
German employers should have supported the country-of-origin principle and 
liberalisation as a means of reducing labour market ‘rigidities.’ Yet, among 
German employers’ associations only the representative of family-owned, 
                                                 
48 Bispinck and Schulten, op. cit. 
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small and medium sized enterprises (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Selbständiger 
Unternehmer - ASU) made a liberal defence of the country-of-origin 
principle.55 Opposition to the draft came most clearly from the Central 
Association of German Crafts and Trades (Zentralverband des Deutschen 
Handwerks - ZDH), which suggested that the Commission had ‘lost touch 
with economic reality.’56 In a joint declaration with the construction union (IG 
BAU), and in its official position presented to the Bundestag, the ZDH 
demanded revision of the directive to insure that receiving members states 
legislated—and enforced—minimum labour, social, health and environmental 
standards for service providers operating within their borders.57 Between 
these extremes, a common position evolved among most organised 
representatives of business—including the peak producers’ and employers’ 
associations—that enthusiastically approved the draft’s efforts to simplify 
bureaucratic procedures for cross-border establishment, but remained 
sceptical about its impact on labour markets. Most regarded the expectation 
that member states of origin could or would enforce the behaviour of their 
service providers in other member states as unrealistic. Consequently, they 
demanded revision of the directive to remove provisions—especially Articles 
24 & 25—that conflicted with existing EU legislation and the Posted Workers 
Directive (96/71/EC) in particular.58
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May 19, 2005. 
 The Federation of German Industry 
(BDI) insisted that the Posted Workers Directive be given unambiguous 
precedence over the Services Directive in employment matters arising from 
56 ZDH ‘Handwerk begrüsst Überarbeitung der Dienstleistungsrichtlinie’, Zentralverband des 
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Bundestag, Ausschuss fuer Wirtschaft und Arbeit 15. Wahlperiode, May 19, 2005. 
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cross-border provision of services.59
 
 Representatives of German business and 
employers greeted service market integration but remained deeply concerned 
about the draft directive’s impact on labour markets. 
The business community’s ambivalence toward the draft directive reflects, at 
least partially, labour’s role in production, particularly in Germany’s core 
exporting industries. Space limitations preclude a full description of the 
complex, interdependent set of state and social institutions that underlie what 
is described as Diversified Quality Production (DQP), Coordinated Market 
Economy (CME), and Rhenisch or German Capitalism.60
 
 Important for this 
study is how these models explain the goods German firms export and the role 
of labour in their production.  
For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany has led the world in terms of 
per capita exports and often absolute exports. Germans export high value-
added producer goods (e.g., machine tools and industrial chemicals) and 
transportation equipment. As the term diversified quality production 
suggests, German exporters compete on world markets less on the basis of 
price and more often on an ability to design and deliver products on terms 
suited to customers’ needs. The capacity to adjust output fluidly to diverse and 
changing customer demands requires firms to maintain skilled and flexible 
work forces that are tightly integrated into production decisions.  
 
The institutionalised, ‘dual’ representation of labour, in sectoral unions as well 
as firm- and plant-level works councils, facilitates this integration. It blurs 
distinctions between management and labour within firms.61 Statutes 
guarantee works councillors influence over the organisation of work within 
firms, while authority over issues normally placed in contracts—particularly 
wages—are reserved for negotiations between sectoral unions and employers 
associations.62
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maintaining firm competitiveness. At the same time, it moves issues where 
management and labour have conflicting interests—such as over wage levels—
outside the firm. A critical result of this ‘dual’ representation of labour is a 
maintenance of internal ‘peace’ within firms that permits them to respond 
flexibly to shifting market conditions and consumer demands. As turbulence 
and the stringent requirements of just-in-time production increasingly shape 
competition on world markets, internally peaceful and flexible German firms 
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have demonstrated themselves to be quite competitive.63 It is this internal 
peace and flexibility and, therefore, external competitiveness that many 
German employers fear they will lose if the post-war system of industrial 
relations erodes too far. Thus, scepticism toward the country-of-origin 
principle was situated not only among craftsman and construction firms that 
might have to compete against lower-paid workers from Central and Eastern 
Europe, but also among Germany’s leading export firms.64
 
 
Given this constellation of societal interests, Germany’s two largest political 
camps, the SPD and CDU/CSU, found themselves united in resistance to 
inclusion of the country-of-origin principle in the draft. In late 2004 and early 
2005 prominent members of Schröder’s Red-Green cabinet had, in fact, 
voiced support for the Commission draft.65 As public insecurity over 
unemployment and internal opposition to the Agenda 2010 swelled within the 
SPD, however, it was Chancellor Schröder, together with French President 
Chirac, who pressured the Commission to redraft the directive.66
 
  
The popular resistance rising against liberalisation in Germany and the EU 
not only split the SPD and forced Schröder to call a general election 12 months 
early, but it also swept up the Centre Right CDU/CSU. Badly misjudging the 
popular mood, CDU Chancellor candidate Angela Merkel ran a neo-liberal 
campaign and watched a 17% lead in opinion polls melt to less than one 
percent of the vote in two months.67 Prior to the election the representative of 
employees’ interests inside the CDU, the CDA (Christlich-Demokratische 
Arbeitnehmerschaft), criticised the country-of-origin principle sharply.68 
Immediately after the election CDU delegations in the state parliaments of 
Baden-Württemburg (BW), Schleswig-Holstein (SH) and North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) joined with the SPD and other parties to pass resolutions 
demanding reform of the draft directive.69
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advocates of ‘social’ Europe overwhelmed liberals within the CDU and the 
Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU-SPD. 
 
German politicians and the German government were instrumental in 
building the coalition that produced the European Parliament’s (EP) amended 
draft of the directive and the Common Position that emerged from the 
Council.70 As rapporteur and coordinator, Evelyn Gebhardt, MEP (PSE/SPD), 
led the effort to remove the country-of-origin principle and limit the draft’s 
scope within the European Parliament. Chairman of the EP Socialist Group, 
Martin Schulz (SPD), convened an ‘informal group’ with the European Peoples 
Party (EPP) leadership to ‘monitor’ the directive’s legislative progress.71 In 
February 2006, a PSE-EPP coalition amended the Commission’s draft 
directive to strike the country-of-origin principle, limit the directive’s scope 
and remove employment regulation from its field of impact. In a press release 
on the day of the EP vote, the German government applauded the efforts of 
‘the two great people’s parties (Volksparteien) in the European Parliament in 
adopting a common line on the Service Directive that considers its social as 
well as economic consequences (Aspekte).’72
 
 It announced that the German 
government would ‘participate in the subsequent negotiations within the 
Council constructively.’ 
The same press release also provides insight into the German government’s 
motivation for removing employment regulation from the directive’s scope. It 
proclaimed the German Grand Coalition’s ‘expressed will’ to take timely 
legislative measures ‘to protect the German labour market from wage 
dumping….’ In doing so, it commissioned a working group under the Federal 
Minister for Labour and Social Policy to consider the issues of minimum 
wages and the posted workers law (AEntG) arising from the EU Services 
Directive. By removing the country-of-origin principle and labour policy 
generally from the directive’s field of impact, Germans created a window of 
opportunity for domestic reform of labour market regulations before the 
internal market for services comes into operation. 
 
The intense resistance to the Bolkestein Draft within Germany reflects the 
peculiar organisation of German labour markets and the expected impact of 
integration on that organisation. Unions and employers expected the 
introduction of an integrated service market, as envisioned by the 
Commission’s initial draft, to accelerate erosion of Germany’s sectoral, 
corporatist labour market regulations in favour of a decentralised alternative. 
Erosion seemed to threaten not only unions and their core constituencies of 
skilled industrial workers, trades workers and construction industries, but 
also exporting firms that relied on the post-war system of labour 
representation to maintain shop floor peace and flexibility. Given the breadth 
of the forces resisting the directive’s original formulation—and the weak 
support for it—Germany’s political leaders unified to remove labour policy 
from the directive’s scope. They could not—and did not want to—prevent 
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service market integration. Rather, they hoped to undertake the labour market 
reforms that integration would require domestically rather than in the context 
of European legislation. The revised services directive opened a window of 
opportunity for such reform that will last until 2010-11. The next section 
considers the choices about institutional change in labour market regulations 
that Germans subsequently confronted. 
 
Institutional Change in German Labour Markets: Bringing 
the State (Back) in? 
 
Removal of employment regulation from the Directive’s scope has 
postponed—but not removed—the need for institutional reform in German 
labour markets. One way or another, Germans will resolve the tension 
between the heterogeneous labour market regulations and Treaty prohibitions 
against discrimination. Before labour markets open to employees from Central 
and Eastern Europe in 2011, Germans will choose the path of institutional 
change. Figure 1 offers four ideal paths to institutional change based on 
whether Germans choose liberal or illiberal regulations and whether such 
measures are introduced incrementally or by a radical legislated break. The 
following considers each of these options, evaluating the consequences and 
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The meaning of ‘radical’ change is, of course, relative to the origin from which 
change proceeds. A complete decentralisation from agreements negotiated 
between sectoral unions and employers associations to contracts agreed 
between individual employers and employees is unlikely. This would require 
revision—or, at least, radical reinterpretation—of the freedom of association 
guaranteed by the Basic Law. Other forms of decentralisation are conceivable, 
however. Voices within the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), for example, 
have advocated revising the Works Constitution Law (specifically, Art.77 
Para.3 BetrVG) to lift restrictions on works councils’ rights to negotiate issues 
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such as wages. While experience with the Services Directive demonstrates 
unions’ capacity to mobilise politically to prevent legislated decentralisation of 
industrial relations, their ability to resist more gradual movement may be 
restricted.  
 
Legislation at the level of the European Union also presents a possibility for 
‘radical liberalisation.’ Decisions by the European Court of Justice in the so-
called Laval (C-341/05), Viking (C-438/05) and Rüffert (C-346/06) cases 
have called into question the application of minimum employment standards 
set out in the Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC) by collective bargaining 
arrangements between social partners.73 In particular, the Court ruled that 
application of minimum standards through flexible collective bargaining 
agreements were too opaque for foreign investors and, therefore, represented 
an unacceptable reason to restrict the freedom to provide services.74
 
 The 
implications of these ruling for Member States which set minimum 
employment standards by collective agreements are still being worked out. 
2. ‘Erosion’ 
 
Incremental decay of the sectoral industrial relations system toward 
decentralisation, or—as Anke Hassel calls it—‘erosion,’ precipitated the 
contemporary dilemma.75 It is also the default option for change. Some 
observers argue that German employers are bringing about decentralisation 
without altering the formal institutions of labour market regulation and co-
determination.76 So-called ‘firm-level alliances for jobs’ have—officially and 
unofficially—tested the limits on what works councillors may negotiate.77
 
  
Unions have, of course, resisted moving wage negotiations back into firms, 
but, as previously noted, their capacity to resist these more gradual changes 
are limited. Accordingly, movement toward greater decentralisation is likely to 
be incremental and dependent on the degree of cohesion that prevails among 
employers. 
This situation is the product of a collective action problem in the industrial 
relations system combined with the ‘rigid’ structure of Germany’s political 
institutions. Erosion proceeds because rising costs tempt small- and medium-
sized firms to ‘stretch’ or abandon the sectoral collective bargaining 
framework.78
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On the one hand, large firms are more able to pay higher wages to maintain 
peace on the shop floor and, therefore, may set wages above a level that which 
their smaller counterparts can maintain. On the other hand, large firms can 
also pass some of their increased wage costs on to their smaller suppliers. This 
has led many smaller employers to ‘stretch’ sectoral agreements by demanding 
‘opening clauses’ that permit them to renegotiate critical elements—including 
wage rates—at the firm and plant level, or to depart from the collective 
bargaining system altogether.79 Outside the collective bargaining system, 
these employers continue to enjoy many of its benefits, including non-
competitive markets for skilled labour and orderly wage bargaining rounds.80
 
 
As with all collective action problems, however, there is a danger that the 
‘tyranny of small decisions,’ will undermine provision of collective benefits. If 
large employers feel the costs of maintaining the system outweigh its benefits, 
they may also abandon it. German employers are cognisant of the costs of 
collapse, however, and recent developments in airline, railroad and healthcare 
systems offer sobering reminders of less pleasant alternatives to centralised 
industrial relations. Some employers also remember the 1960s and early 
1970s when, in a booming economy, the collective bargaining system served to 
reduce upward pressures on wages rather than put a floor under their 
downward movement. Thus, erosion of the post-war industrial relations 
system threatens many interests, including those of many employers, and 
incites calls to stop the decay. It is not clear, however, that even a 
preponderance of societal interests can prevent this process. 
The structure of German political institutions inhibits legislative efforts to 
shore up the existing system of industrial relations. Germany’s decentralised, 
‘semi-sovereign’ political institutions provide many opportunities for 
minorities to block legislated reform.81 First, major reforms often need to gain 
support from differing partisan majorities in the upper and lower houses of 
the German parliament. Second, unions and employers wishing to resist 
change have used the FRG’s legal system and its strong protection of 
Tarifautonomie to block government attempts to reform labour markets.82
 
 
Thus, any attempt to stem erosion and avoid default liberalisation by 
legislating labour market reforms will require a very broad coalition 
supporting it. 
3. ‘Legislated Standards’  
 
For many of the reasons mentioned above transformation of the German 
system toward one in which the state determines the principle conditions of 
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employment is equally unlikely. Even the prospect of legislating a floor 
underneath wages has provoked resistance from not only employers, but also 
some unions. In particular unions representing skilled employees in the 
metalworking/engineering and chemical industries, IG Metall and IG BCE, 
resist weakening Tarifautonomie and moving wage determination ‘to the 
[legislative arena] where [unions], under certain circumstances, have little 
influence.’83
 
 Since 2004, the SPD has advocated introduction of ‘minimum 
wages’ and, in 2006, the DGB adopted a similar position. This formulation is 
misleading and should not be equated with a legislated minimum wage. 
Unions and employer resistance to state intervention at the expense of their 
influence is sufficient to prevent large scale reorganisation of labour market 
institutions along, say, French lines. This, however, does not mean that the 
state is not being drawn increasingly into German labour markets. 
4. Reinforced Corporatism + Minimum Wage 
 
The fourth—and most likely—path for change in German labour market 
institutions involves state intervention to reinforce corporatism and 
‘minimum wages.’ As noted above, ‘minimum wages’—and many employment 
standards—can be set by legislation, contract or a combination of the two. 
Provisions in some countries permit state actors to declare contract 
agreements negotiated between representative unions and employers 
organisations binding for all employment in a given sector and/or region. The 
EU Posted Workers Directive (96/71) explicitly allows such arrangements and 
the German Posted Workers Law (AEntG) permits the Federal Minister for 
Labour and Social Policy to declare contracts universally binding in those 
sectors that are under its jurisdiction and that negotiate contracts for the 
entire territory of the FRG or in all of its regions.84 As noted above, the Posted 
Workers Law has been extended from the building industry to cover other 
sectors. Some voices, particularly within the unions, advocate extension of the 
Posted Workers Law across all sectors, enabling German unions and 
employers associations to set a wage minimum which would also bind foreign 
employers operating within the FRG.85 There are several technical problems 
associated with such a solution. Many sectors do not negotiate blanket 
contracts covering all of the FRG, or each of its territories or have collective 
bargaining at all. Furthermore, even in some sectors with collective bargaining 
(e.g. security guards, hairdressers, hotel and hospitality), contractual 
minimum wages are already below the poverty level.86
 
 Low wages and gaps in 
the collective bargaining system have led analysts within the SPD, the Left 
Party and, service sector unions (Ver.di, NGG) to advocate a legal minimum 
wage in addition to reinforcing the contractual system. 
Mechanisms for determining legislated minimum wages can also assume 
different forms that give greater or lesser powers to the state and social actors. 
Some countries, such as the US, introduce minimum wages as a simple 
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legislative act, while others require consultation with (e.g. UK) or even 
consent from (e.g. Belgium) unions and employers.87
 
 Thus, while a legislated 
minimum wages—like universally binding contractual wages—have the force 
of law, the determination of minimum wage levels may include a strong dose 
of corporatism. The role of corporate social actors in determining legal 
minimum wages, of course, depends on their inclusion in construction of 
institutions for setting minimum wages. 
The political problems of reinforcing corporatist labour market regulation are 
more complicated than the technical problems. Both the extension of 
mechanisms making collective negotiations legally binding or the introduction 
of a legal minimum wage involves renegotiating and re-institutionalising the 
influence of employers’ and employees’ representatives in labour markets. The 
distributive effects of such institutional reform are enormous and the 
consequences long-lasting. Either extension of the Posted Workers Law or 
introduction of a legal minimum wage will increase state involvement in 
labour markets at the expense of Tarifautonomie. Increased state influence 
will raise union and employer concerns about the behaviour of future 
governments, making them hesitant to embrace reform. Furthermore, the 
structure of German legislative and judicial institutions may permit even 
relatively small minorities to block reforms. Thus, reform will require a broad 
social coalition. Employers and employees who benefit by preserving the core 
of the post-war industrial relations system will have to accommodate the 
interests of those who fall outside it. While this implies some degree of 
decentralisation of employment regulation it may also imply a need for 
increased capacity by employers associations and unions to ensure that 
decentralisation is not exploited for ‘free riding.’ The failure to build such a 
coalition raises the spectre of liberal decentralisation and the implications 
such a development will have for not only the welfare of (some) German 
employees and the competitiveness of German exporters. Broad German 
resistance to the original draft of the Services Directive suggests the potential 
for such a coalition, although its mobilisation for positive institutional reform 




The strength and breadth of German opposition to the Bolkestein Draft 
reflects German labour markets’ peculiar vulnerability to broad application of 
the country-of-origin principle as well as uncertainties arising from the on-
going liberalisation of these markets. For many Germans—including unions 
and employers as well as Christian and Social Democrats—the initial draft of 
the Services Directive threatened to advance, perhaps irretrievably, the 
erosion of Germany’s post-war industrial relations system. Accordingly, this 
constellation of interests mobilised Germany’s considerable influence in EU 
institutions to revise the draft and shift labour market reform to domestic 
legislative arenas. Revision of the Services Directive, however, has postponed 
reform of German labour markets, but it has not removed pressures driving 
that process. 
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Service market integration and European integration, more broadly, are 
advancing the transformation of Germany’s labour market institutions. 
Increasing integration of and competition in global markets—developments 
advanced by both European integration and German unification—have 
contributed to firm flight from employers’ associations and erosion of 
Germany’s post-war industrial relations system. This erosion set the stage on 
which introduction of the Bolkestein Draft provoked broad opposition in 
Germany. The success of this opposition, however, indicates that complete 
liberalisation of the post-war order is hardly a foregone conclusion. Indeed, 
very public ‘debates’ in Germany about shoring up the post-war system of 
sectoral bargaining by extending the scope of the Posted Workers Law 
(AEntG) or by introducing a legislated minimum wage are well under way. 
That said, nothing guarantees that a coalition united in resistance to European 
‘reform’ of German labour market institutions can be sustained to carry out 
this delicate operation domestically. 
 
The path Germans choose in the time remaining before European integration 
closes the ‘window of opportunity’ for domestic institutional reform is 
pregnant with insights about the impact of international market liberalisation 
on institutions of national political economies. These developments will add 
insight about what constellations of political/legislative institutions direct 
pressures for change toward liberalisation and where established interest 
organisations can exploit the institutional advantages of incumbency to shape 
developments. The outlines of a reinforced—and modified—form of 
corporatist industrial relations system are, for example, visible in the 
proposed extension of the Posted Workers Law and some proposals for a 
legislated minimum wage. These observations, in turn, raise questions about 
the process of institutional change and whether and how such change might 
take place incrementally.88 How close are the ‘complementarities’ between 
institutions in national economic ‘models’?89 Can ‘hybridised’ arrangements, 
with corporatist and more liberal elements side-by-side, persist?90
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 Answers to 
such questions require time and comparative analysis. 
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